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Abstract Over the past two decades, molecular technologies have transformed the
landscape of cancer diagnosis, treatment and disease surveillance. However, although the effects
of these technologies in the areas of primary and secondary cancer prevention have been the focus
of growing study, their role in tertiary prevention remains largely unexamined. Treating this topic as
a problematic to be conceptually explored rather than empirically demonstrated, this article focuses
on the molecularisation of tertiary prevention, especially the growing use of molecular biomarkers
to monitor disease recurrence. Taking a semiotic approach, I speculate on the potential meanings of
molecular biomarkers for people living with and beyond cancer and suggest the meanings of these
technologies may differ in important ways for those on both sides of the risk divide: that is, those
‘at risk’ for cancer and those living with realised risk. Although molecular biomarkers may intensify
a sense of ‘measured vulnerability’, by indexing cancer’s presence they may also prove reassuring.
Moreover, as an invisible but ostensibly ‘transparent’ sign, in some contexts they appear to enable
cancer survivors to challenge biomedical decision making. In the light of recent oncological debates
about the value of these biomarkers in tertiary prevention, I conclude by suggesting that signs can
never be reduced to their ‘objective’ biomedical denotation in spite of professional attempts to
expunge meaning and value from care.
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Between sign and symptom there is a decisive difference that assumes value only
against the background of an essential identity; the sign is the symptom itself, but in its
original truth. (Foucault, 1989, p. 115)
Introduction
Over the past six decades, the rise of cancer screening programmes has transformed
the landscape of cancer diagnosis, treatment and disease surveillance. Central to such
programmes is the assumption that diseases have latent, early and late manifestations, and
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that intervention towards the beginning of this natural history can change – or even prevent
– an otherwise assured outcome (Armstrong, 2012). Although preventing cancer from
emerging in the first place has long been perceived as the ideal, the lack of options for
primary prevention led to a focus on early detection in the post-World War II era, which
became conceptualised as a form of ‘secondary prevention’. Thus, from the second half of
the twentieth century, stopping the disease early by catching it in its latent stage became the
goal of cancer screening programmes, although early detection was often conflated with
primary prevention in terms of how screening technologies such as mammograms, pap
smears and so on were ‘sold’ to the population at large (Fosket, 2010, p. 335).
Since the late 1980s, these cancer screening technologies have been joined by a growing
array of biomarkers that diagnose cancer – and cancer risk – on a molecular level. The
identification of genetic biomarkers of cancer susceptibility has opened up new possibilities
for primary prevention, leading to the emergence of tests that screen for genetic carriers of
the mutations. It has also stimulated an interest in chemoprevention for those deemed at
increased genetic risk for developing cancer; for example, women carrying mutations in the
BRCA1/2 genes are now being offered risk-reduction drugs such as tamoxifen (see Eeles and
Powles, 2000; Fosket, 2010). The emergence of molecular technologies has also led to
a variety of developments in the area of secondary cancer prevention, as proteinic
biomarkers of effect (biomarkers associated with possible or established disease) are being
widely used to screen for cancer, including prostate-specific antigen (PSA) screening for
prostate cancer, cancer antigen 125 (CA125) screening for ovarian cancer and human
papillomavirus (HPV) screening for cervical cancer.1
Although much of the impetus for the development of molecular screening technologies
has related to their possibilities for primary and secondary prevention, with fund-raising
campaigns inviting us to imagine a ‘world without cancer’, these molecular biomarkers have
also increasingly made their way into tertiary prevention as well. Tertiary prevention refers
to those aspects of clinical activity involved with reducing the negative impacts of established
disease by restoring function and reducing disease-related complications such as cancer
recurrence and second primary cancers (Sagar and Lawenda, 2009). Today, proteinic
biomarkers are being widely used to monitor patients treated for a number of types of
cancer, with regular tumour marker blood tests now an indelible feature of the experience
of cancer ‘survivorship’ (see Ludwig and Weinstein, 2005). However, as Aronowitz (2009)
has pointed out, although social scientists have a growing interest in the expansion of
preventive medicine into otherwise healthy populations, far less attention has been paid to
parallel developments among the already sick or diagnosed.
1 Although the PSA test is widely available, its use as a screening tool remains controversial, with the
originator of the test condemning its role in cancer screening based on available evidence that PSA
screening does not lead to fewer deaths from prostate cancer but leads to substantial over-diagnosis and
over-treatment of the disease (Ablin, 2010). CA125 is not currently recommended for population-level
screening, but the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence, the organisation responsible for
determining clinical and public health guidelines in the United Kingdom, has recently (and controversially)
recommended the use of the test in primary care settings for women who present with symptoms
associated with ovarian cancer (see Olaitan, 2011). Women concerned about ovarian cancer can also
request the test (see Fayed, 2009). HPV testing is a standard component of cervical cancer screening, along
with the pap smear itself.
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There has been a profound, if largely unnoticed, shift in who is understood to be
suffering from chronic disease and the disease experience itself. In many instances,
chronic disease has become a kind of risk state in which diagnosis, treatment, and
‘disease management’ are directed at reducing the chances of anticipated, feared
developments. (Aronowitz, 2009, p. 419)
How has the incorporation of molecular technologies in the area of tertiary prevention
transformed patients’ experience of cancer? If cancer ‘survivorship’ has become a kind of
risk state in which diagnosis, treatment and disease management are directed at reducing the
chances of anticipated, feared developments, can we assume, qua Aronowitz (2009), that
the experience of being ‘at risk’ for cancer and ‘at risk’ for cancer recurrence or disease
progression have converged? In my view, this is a phenomenon that needs to be explored
rather than assumed.
My goal in this article is to consider the ways in which molecular screening technologies
may be impacting the experiences of people with a history of cancer, including both those
who have been declared ‘disease-free’ and those living with active disease. I am particularly
interested in the similarities and differences between those on each side of the risk divide:
that is, both those ‘at risk’ of cancer and those ‘at risk’ of disease recurrence or progression.
Through a focus on the semiotic transformations molecular technologies potentially
engender, I aim to illustrate some of the ways these technologies differ from those that
precede them and how their effects may vary in the contexts of secondary and tertiary
prevention. I argue that attempts to limit their semiotic meanings or to pathologise those
who ‘misinterpret’ these technologies fundamentally misunderstand the nature of signs.
I also highlight their socio-political context and the ways in which their ‘appropriate’ usage
has become tied up with the responsibilities of the ‘good’ consumer/citizen.
I should make it clear at the outset that the ideas presented in this article are exploratory
and heuristic. Although informed by ongoing research with people who have lived through
and beyond cancer, in the present article I treat this topic as a problematic to be conceptually
explored rather than empirically demonstrated. My arguments are thus based primarily on
a reading of the published literature. However, by offering a semiotically informed analysis,
I hope to provide a perspective on these technologies that may benefit social scientists
conducting research into this important area.
Conceptualising Molecular Screening Technologies
The growing incorporation of molecular biomarkers into cancer prevention since the late
1980s has been conceptualised as part of a larger transition that Clarke et al (2003, 2010)
have labelled biomedicalisation: the ‘increasingly complex, multisited, multidirectional
processes of medicalisation that today are being both extended and reconstituted through
the emergent social forms and practices of a highly and increasingly technoscientific
biomedicine’ (2010, p. 47). Through processes of technoscientisation, biomedicine
increasingly visualises life at the molecular level in terms of genes, molecules and proteins.
This ‘molecular gaze’ is enmeshed in a molecular style of thought about ‘life itself’, which
has seen the body fragmented and reconfigured in new ways (Rose, 2007).
Bell
126 r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 8, 2, 124–143
The new ‘molecular biopolitics’ (Rose, 2007) engendered by the molecularisation of
cancer screening technologies has been the focus of some interest among social scientists,
although the majority of research to date has focused on genetic testing, especially in
relation to the BRCA1/2 genes (for example, Polzer, 2000; Press et al, 2000; Gibbon, 2007;
Gibbon et al, 2010). Such studies have shown that these predictive tests often serve to
fundamentally alter people’s experience of cancer risk. As Shostak (2010) notes, individuals
with no symptoms of illness are seen as ‘marked’ at the molecular level as ‘at high risk’
for adverse health outcomes. These tests, in turn, often facilitate new forms of bio-
sociality and somatic individuality as those so labelled start to organise around the
commonality of their shared genetic status and the new ‘truths’ it inscribes (Rabinow,
1996; Novas and Rose, 2000). For example, people deemed to be at genetic risk for
cancer are increasingly conceptualised as ‘previvors’:2 ‘survivors of a predisposition to
cancer’ – a community seen to have its own unique needs and concerns (see FORCE,
2011). To a lesser extent, scholars have also highlighted the forms of embodied risk
stemming from elevated PSA levels (Evans et al, 2007; Gillespie, 2012) and testing
positive for HPV (Kavanagh and Broom, 1997; Aronowitz, 2010) – factors associated
with heightened prostate and cervical cancer risk, respectively, but that do not in
themselves constitute evidence of the disease. This empirical work speaks to the growing
diseasification of risk that molecular screening technologies facilitate, with risk ‘treated’
in much the same way as disease itself, through medical means such as medication,
behaviour modification and surgical intervention (Armstrong, 1995; Sachs, 1995; Clarke
et al, 2003, 2010; Aronowitz, 2009; Sulik, 2011; Gillespie, 2012).
Several scholars concerned with processes of biomedicalisation have focused their
attention on the semiotic dimensions of visual artefacts associated with ‘things medical’
(Clarke, 2010, p. 104), and the social, cultural, political and other contexts in which these
artefacts are embedded (for example, Mamo and Fosket, 2009; Clarke, 2010; Joyce, 2010).
Situated within this larger framework, in the present article I focus on the semiotic effects of
these new molecular ways of visualising the internal workings of the body. As molecular
biomarkers are first and foremost a biomedical sign, semiotic perspectives have a great deal
to offer those interested in the meanings and effects of these technologies.
From a semiotic perspective, all disease monitoring technologies are signs embedded in
two types of sign relations: syntagmatic relations and paradigmatic (or ‘associative’)
relations. Syntagmatic relations are fundamentally sequential: ‘in its place in a syntagma,
any unit acquires its value simply in opposition to what precedes, or to what follows, or to
both’ (de Saussure, 1983, p. 171). A syntagm is thus an orderly combination of interacting
signifiers that form a meaningful whole (Chandler, 2007, p. 81). Imaging and molecular
technologies form a part of a complex syntagmatic chain, and their value is generated
relationally, in the context of the histological, cytological and other data oncologists use to
determine diagnostic and prognostic information. However, these technologies are also
embedded in paradigmatic relations. Unlike syntagmatic relations, paradigmatic relations
are endless, as they acquire their meaning from what is absent rather than what is present.
They are groups formed by mental association and ‘hold between terms representing
2 The implicit referent for the term ‘previvor’ is ‘survivor’, suggesting a paradigmatic connection between
these two groups, which is, of course, precisely Aronowitz’s (2009) point.
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a mnemonic group’ (de Saussure, 1983, p. 172). It is here that we start to see some important
differences between the two technologies.
The distinctions between traditional imaging and newer molecular technologies relate
primarily to their differences as sign types. According to Peirce’s (1931–1958, 2. p. 306)
influential triadic classification of sign modalities, there are three types of signs: icons,
indexes and symbols3. Iconic signs are those in which the relationship between the form the
sign takes and its object is based primarily on resemblance (for example, a portrait),
indexical signs are those in which this relationship is based on a physical or causal
connection (for example, smoke signifies fire) and symbolic signs are those where the
relationship is arbitrary – established by convention (for example, language). At first glance,
imaging technologies would appear to be indexical signs, much along the lines of
photographs. In Peirce’s (1998, 2. p. 34) words:
Photographs, especially instantaneous photographs, are very instructive, because we
know that they are in certain respects exactly like the objects they represent [i.e.,
icons]. But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under
such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to
nature. In that aspect, then, they belong to the second class of signs [indexes], those by
physical connection.
However, as Dumit (1999) has shown, although imaging technologies such as X-rays and CT
(computerised tomography) scans are infused with the persuasive power of photographs,
they are more than photographic representations because they purport to represent what no
human can see. Thus, as signifiers, their value comes primarily from their perceived likeness
to the internal landscape of the body. For this reason, scholars working in the Peircean
tradition generally classify imaging technologies as iconic (for example, Nessa, 1996).
A suspicious light clump on a mammogram is inspected for its resemblance to a malignant
tumour; a blob on a CT scan is studied for its likeness to an abnormal growth. Molecular
technologies, on the other hand, are more clearly indexical in nature: cancerous cells cause
an increase in particular serum biomarkers; genetic mutations may cause cancer to emerge.
These biomarkers themselves do not resemble cancer; they index its presence, or, in the case
of biomarkers of susceptibility, its potential presence.
Molecular technologies also quantify magnitude of disease in a way rather different from
traditional imaging technologies.4 The main function of mammograms, CT scans and so on
is to determine whether cancer is present in the body. In other words, their utility hinges on
their ability to ascertain the disease’s presence or absence. Thus, although imaging
technologies are used in clinical staging, determining the extent of disease before direct
examination of the tumour and its spread, this quantification process is not where their
primary value resides (and clinical staging is generally perceived as inferior to pathologic
staging for this reason). Molecular biomarkers, on the other hand, intrinsically involve
3 Importantly, these modes of relationship are ideal types; in reality, signs partake of all three qualities to
varying degrees (Peirce, 1931–1958, 2. p. 306).
4 This holds less true for some of the newer ‘imaging’ technologies, such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging, which is more accurately classed as a molecular technology. As Roskies (2007) demonstrates in
her work on neuroimaging, although these images are understood as photographs of brain activity, what
they are sensitive to is not visual information but magnetic signals.
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a process of quantification. As Shostak (2010, p. 255) notes, molecular practices ‘are used to
define a continuum from health to illness with different quantities of markers of “disease
accumulation” marking an individual’s position and movement along the continuum’. Under
a molecular gaze, disease accumulation is not an either/or scenario – one cannot, for
example, measure 0 on a PSA test. Indeed, if molecular biomarkers enable scientists to
penetrate the silence of the organs (Rose, 2007), it is numbers that ultimately allow them
to visualise the invisible (Sachs, 1995; Adelswa¨rd and Sachs, 1996). Thus, from a semiotic
perspective, the molecular gaze may very well translate to a numeric gaze – a point to which
I now turn.
‘Measured Vulnerability’: Commonalities in Experience Across the
Risk Divide
Sulik (2009, 2011), following Clarke et al (2003, 2010), has argued that the illness identity
has increasingly become a technoscientific one, with many patients beginning to think of
themselves in technoscientific terms. Thus, biomedical labels and classifications, rather than
their individual suffering, are often determining factors in patients’ knowledge synthesis and
decision making – a phenomenon that seems equally true of patients’ experiences of risk
in the realms of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.
On the basis of US research with women and men with elevated cholesterol levels and men
with elevated PSA levels, Gillespie (2012) develops the concept of ‘measured vulnerability’
to describe the experiences of those people who undergo a shift in their health status as
a result of numeric scores on health risk assessments and screenings. He argues that the lack
of symptoms associated with elevated cholesterol or PSA levels intensified the pervasiveness
of participants’ sense of vulnerability, as they were unable to determine their risk without
undergoing additional tests. However, these tests only served to intensify uncertainty,
creating a vortex of spiralling risk. In consequence, those with elevated cholesterol levels
often described themselves as a ‘ticking time bomb’ (p. 199), and men with elevated PSA
levels expressed a sense of inevitability regarding the eventual onset of prostate cancer. Sachs
(1995, 1996; see also Adelswa¨rd and Sachs, 1996) similarly describes the ways in which
Swedish men with elevated cholesterol levels came to rely on these tests, which they saw as
‘true’ indicators of their health status, regardless of how they actually felt. Abstract test
figures thus became a strong focus in their lives and transformed their perception of their
bodies, leading to a pervasive sense of felt risk.
In many respects, cancer survivors – particularly those for whom biomarkers feature
prominently as a means of monitoring disease recurrence and progression – appear to differ
little from people identified as ‘at risk’ for disease through biomarker screening. These
technologies, and the numbers they generate, are often woven through survivors’ accounts of
life post-diagnosis in central ways. For example, my earlier ethnographic research with
prostate cancer survivors attending a cancer support group suggested that for some men
PSA monitoring facilitated a view of prostate cancer cells as lying dormant within them,
ready to be reactivated at some future date (Bell and Kazanjian, 2011). Thus, their emo-
tional state became directly tied to their PSA levels, which were seen as a material index of
cancer.
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This phenomenon has also been frequently noted in anecdotal reports and empirical
studies of ovarian cancer survivors, with the CA125 biomarker coming to play a prominent
role in many women’s experiences of cancer survivorship (for example, Hamilton, 1999;
Guppy and Rustin, 2002; Howell et al, 2003; Palmer et al, 2006; Parker et al, 2006; Chitale,
2009). According to Hamilton (1999, p. 339):
Many women begin to identify their CA125 levels as the evidence of disease statusy.
Unfortunately, even normal insignificant fluctuations in CA125 levels take on
enormous meaning. As a result, emotional well-being may come to depend on lower
CA125 numbers, even if numbers remain in the normal range. Patients may find
themselves on an ‘emotional roller coaster’ with ups and downs determined by the
direction of serum blood levels.
Cancer listservs attest to a similar phenomenon, with some patients assuming that rising
tumour markers in the absence of other signs or symptoms of disease portent a recurrence.
For example, in 2010 ‘koe123’ wrote on an online testicular cancer forum:
im 26 this yr, early last year i was diagnosed with stage II seminoma which i then went
thru 4xBEP [a chemotherapy regimen] and completed it. Since then, everything has
been going well as i have always been clear from my check ups and scans until last
week.My blood test result showed a high level of LDH [a molecular biomarker], 1003
when the normal range is between 100–300.[y] i dont know what else can be
affecting this elevation other then a relapse[y] im really freaking out, im praying
i dont have to go back into treatment. (TC-Cancer.com, 2011, emphasis added)
After 3 weeks, koe123 reposted that he had completed another blood test, noting that his
blood serum levels had dropped but were still outside the normal range. Indicating that this
appeared to be a positive development, he nevertheless asked ‘is it true that it is unlikely
a relapse?’ Striking here is koe123’s reluctance to accept that the elevation in his serum levels
is meaningless. Signs, as koe123 well knows, must signify something.
The Semiotic Potency of Numbers
What these various accounts allude to is the meaning numbers often come to hold in the lives
of those monitored via molecular biomarkers, regardless of whether they are deemed to be at
risk for disease or disease recurrence or progression. In this context, numbers are imbued
with a seductive allure that is difficult to resist.5 Numbers, it seems, ‘control the wills of
those who make use of them’ (Crump, 1990, p. 13). That numerical information becomes an
important reference point for cancer patients and patients-in-waiting has been noted
previously, albeit primarily in the context of risk and survival estimates. For example,
Robertson (2001) documents the preoccupation with numbers among Canadian women at
risk of breast cancer, with such women intent on assigning themselves a specific risk figure
(for example, ‘a 50/50 chance’ of being diagnosed with the disease). A similar fixation with
5 Interestingly, this phenomenon is also evident in MacIntyre’s (1999) study of the emotional role of T cells
counts in the lives of men living with asymptomatic HIV. For men who initially tried to avoid playing the
numbers game, once they succumbed to testing, ‘retreat was out of the question’ (p. 133).
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prognostic estimates has been also been documented among cancer survivors (Thorne
et al, 2006).
Although numbers are symbolic phenomena, they are distinct types of symbols. Unlike
other aspects of language, ‘Numerals are clearly weird, atypical of language generally,
because the things they denote, numbers, are entities unlike the kind of entities dealt with in
the rest of language, say persons, places, things, actions, states and qualities’ (Hurford in
Crump, 1990, p. viii). There is generally understood to be an isomorphic relation between
the structure of mathematics and the structure of reality (Crump, 1990, p. 3), evident in the
truism that ‘mathematics is the universal language’. Indeed, Peirce (1894) himself clearly
placed mathematical reasoning in the realm of iconic signs, based on the likeness of
mathematical equations to phenomena in the natural world (that is, their ability to describe
such phenomena). However, for Peirce (1905), this iconicity did not extend to statistics,
a field he spoke of rather disparagingly:
A probabilityy is the known ratio of frequency of a specific future event to a generic
future event which includes ity . What, then, does it mean to say that if a man sees a
phenomenon occur on m successive days, the probability is mþ 1/mþ2 that the same
phenomenon will appear on the next following day?y . It plainly means nothing at all
of any consequence.
Despite Peirce’s disdain, statistics have become a pervasive aspect of our daily lives. As
Hacking (1990, p. 4) has observed, the media constantly bombards us with probabilities and
statistics; the statistics of our pleasures and vices are relentlessly tabulated and our public
fears about cancers, muggings, earthquakes, AIDS and so on are endlessly debated in terms
of probabilities. For Hacking (1990, p. 5), the world itself has become numerical; we have
gained a fundamentally quantitative feel for nature, both how it is and how it ought to be.
More importantly, statistics carry the authority of science. Numbers do not seem arbitrary or
biased; their rhetorical effectiveness is facilitated by their apparently neutral non-rhetorical
nature and the assumption of calculation as an impersonal, mechanical routine impermeable
to human desires and biases (Potter et al, 1991, p. 358; see also Porter, 1995; Best, 2001).
Thus, despite their lack of material connection with ‘anything of consequence’, statistics
have a peculiar power to produce a sense of foreboding and insecurity – ‘statistical panic’ in
Woodward’s (1999) framing. As Woodward (1999, p. 186) notes, ‘If we generally regard
statistics as a depersonalizing forcey we see that when we apply them to ourselves, creating
our own emotional dramas out of them, they can have an overwhelming power, orienting us
to the world in a particular way’. Although cancer patients and patients-in-waiting may
actively manoeuvre, reframe and discount the odds, they are ‘absorbed into the truth of
prognosis, a truth that recursively projects a future as it acts as a container for a present’
(Jain, 2007, p. 79). The ‘truth’ of prognosis appears ineluctable.
However, semiotically speaking, there are important differences between risk/survival
probabilities and the numbers produced in the context of disease monitoring. For the
numbers generated through monitoring via molecular biomarkers may be symbolic, but
they are simultaneously a direct numeric representation of a serum seen to index cancer’s
presence. In other words, the relationship is one of contiguity: cancer’s presence causes an
elevation in certain proteinic biomarkers. This is not the case for risk or prognostic
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estimates, which are both strikingly specific and bloodlessly vague (Jain, 2007). After all,
you will either be diagnosed with cancer or you will not. And for those diagnosed with the
disease, ‘you will only die or not die; you will not 70, or 42, or 97 per cent die’ ( Jain, 2007,
p. 81).
Thus, unlike statistical estimates of risk and prognosis, biomarker counts seem to belong
to the world of hard facts: they represent a truth extracted from one’s blood (c.f. Biehl et al,
2001). Of course, this distinction is more artificial than real. To ‘speak’, serum biomarkers
are counted and converted into numeric scores – a process, as Martin and Lynch (2009) have
shown, that is far from innocent. ‘Techniques for counting co-evolved with the entities being
counted and the entities were brought into being as ontologically distinct when they were
rendered countable’ (p. 248). For example, the understanding of chromosomes as discrete
entities and the theories generated about them as hereditary units were constitutively tied up
with counting techniques that ‘immobilized, separated and enhanced them’ (p. 248).
However, the work of counting is rendered invisible and naturalised.
Realised Risk and Measured Certainty
In the light of these distinctive features of biomarkers, the meaning they hold may differ for
people ‘at risk’ of cancer and those for whom the risks of cancer have been realised – that is,
people who have been treated for cancer and who are currently disease-free and those living
with active disease. Although such biomarkers may facilitate a new orientation to the body,
generating a pervasive sense of ‘measured vulnerability’, an important difference is that
anxiety and vulnerability are integral to the experience of life post-diagnosis, regardless of
the form surveillance takes. Back in 1981 (long before these molecular technologies made
their first appearance), Koocher and O’Malley coined the term ‘Damocles Syndrome’ to
describe the manifestation of this anxiety in its more acute and incapacitating form. As the
name of the syndrome suggests, the inspiration for this ongoing sense of embodied
vulnerability was the legend of Damocles, who was forced to eat at a magnificent banquet
with a sword hanging over his head, suspended from the ceiling by a single hair and poised
to plunge into his neck at any moment.
It is little wonder, therefore, that Frank’s (1991) concept of the ‘remission society’ – those
people living in contemporary society who are effectively well but could never be considered
‘cured’ – emerged largely from his personal experience with cancer. As Comaroff and
Maguire (1981) note, the meaning of the term ‘remission’ is profoundly ambiguous, both
clinically and experientially. Is the retreat of symptoms partial or total? This condition thus
raises problems of meaning; although one may be successfully treated for cancer, one is
rarely (except in very specific circumstances) seen as ‘cured’. In consequence, the absence
of symptoms of disease provides little reassurance regarding the absence of disease itself –
after all such absence generally characterises the context of diagnosis in the first place. To
quote Jain (2007, p. 80):
Cancer is creepy. After it shows up one realizes that it must have been there for
a while, growing, dispersing, scattering, sending out feelers and fragments. After
the treatments, often one hasn’t any idea if it is still there, slinking about in
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organs or through the lymph system – those parts of the body you can’t really even
visualize.
Paradigmatically speaking, absence is semiotically loaded – ripe with meaning. As William
James pointed out, the absence of an item determines our representations as much as its
presence could ever do (cited in Chandler, 2007, p. 88).
The anxiety absence produces seems to permeate the experience of cancer itself – from
diagnosis through treatment, as well as after therapy has ended. Thus, my previous research
suggests that cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy may occasionally experience more
distress from the absence of treatment side effects than from the side effects themselves
because of the ways that toxicity is seen to index effectiveness, providing an apparently
objective measure of how well the treatment is working (Bell, 2009). In a much earlier study
of patient experiences of chemotherapy, Nerenz et al (1982, p. 1026) observed an even more
curious phenomenon – that patients often became particularly distressed after palpable
disease signs had disappeared, a response they ultimately interpreted as follows:
When the disease is directly palpable, it has definite size, shape, consistency, and
location. Changes in disease status can be directly and objectively monitored so that
even an increase in size of palpable nodes can be processed objectively. When the
disease is not palpable, however, there is no way to control such emotional states as
fear or anxiety about spread of the disease by resorting to objective indices of its
change.
Clearly, molecular biomarkers provide such an indices for some patients – albeit one entirely
removed from the embodied signs that precede it during cancer treatment (for example, hair
loss, flaky skin, reduction in palpable nodes). By marking an individual’s position and
movement along a continuum, by moving beyond the presence/absence binary, they may
prove more reassuring than absence itself.6
This sense of ‘measured certainty’ (to invert Gillespie’s phrase) provided through numeric
indices is evident in published accounts of cancer survivorship, with an ovarian cancer
survivor quoted in Howell et al’s (2003, p. 12) study emphasising the sense of reassurance
that accompanies low serum biomarker levels:
yMy CA-125 was always under 30. For six years it was under 30. I went from going
every 3 months to every 6 months to once a year. For six years I had nothing. I never
even thought about it, you know. I never once had a dream about cancer. I thought
I was curedy because I was asymptomatic and my CA-125 was always under 30,
which means there was no tumor activity going on. Because that always goes up when
there’s tumor activity for sure. (emphasis added)
In this woman’s case, the feeling of security unfortunately turned out to be false, and she was
therefore blindsided by a cancer recurrence; however, that her CA125 levels provided her
with a sense of ‘measured’ reassurance – ‘for 6 years it was under 30’ – is clear.
6 I freely acknowledge that this largely contradicts my prior reading of PSA monitoring (see Bell and
Kazanjian, 2011).
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Evidence of such ‘measured’ reassurance is also illustrated in my own research, as
the account of ‘Arthur’, a 57-year-old Canadian prostate cancer survivor, suggests.7
Interestingly, Arthur was not clear on the stage of cancer he had been diagnosed with – ‘He
[the oncologist] said I was sort of in the middle y. They didn’t catch it really early, they
didn’t catch it late’. Far more meaningful to Arthur were his PSA numbers, which he made
promiscuous reference to throughout the interview. For example, when conversation turned
to whether Arthur had received PSA testing since his treatment ended, he responded:
Ah, yeah, and it was very, very low, like 0.02y it was great, great, great news. And so
things look really good right now. But, you know, they take these PSA tests regularly,
and what they are watching for is sudden spikes, suddenly it goes up, shoots up. Then
there’s an indication that there’s a problem, if it stays, you know, around 0.02 or 0.04,
whatever. Once it was 0.08 and it came back to 0.4, whatever. He [the physician] said,
‘If it changes like that’, he said, ‘Your body is going to go through a lot of changes
still in years to come. You know this is all going to take years to work its way through
your body’.
For Arthur and his physician, his PSA number indexed what was happening inside him.
Slight fluctuations in his PSA were a sign of the cancer ‘working’ its way through his body
and a constantly low number signified that the disease remained at bay. Thus, in response to
a question about whether he thought of himself as ‘cured’, Arthur stated: ‘So yeah, I think
I have the odds in my favour, you know. So, it’s not just wishful thinking, it’s a case of, you
know, the way it went, and the PSA count is so low now, it’s looking good. It’s looking good,
yeah’. As an ‘objective’ sign, his low PSA score reassured him that the possibility of cure was
not just ‘wishful thinking’. Arthur’s statements suggest that in a context marked by ongoing
uncertainty and fear, the semiotic potency of biomarker numbers as transparent, material
indices may be substantially heightened.
Realised Risk and Challenging Biomedical Assessments
Another related feature of biomarker numbers also worth highlighting is the relative clarity
they may provide amidst cancer’s semiotic ‘din’. Increased diagnostic testing has meant that
patients are increasingly caught in an ever-expanding web of tests, with their putative
associations between objective signifiers of clinical variation and the probabilities of
different diseases (Aronowitz, 2009, p. 429). The language required to understand
biomedical technoscience is esoteric, complex and virtually incomprehensible to patients,
granting authority to biomedical knowledge and positioning as experts those who produce
and communicate it (Sulik, 2011, p. 469). As ‘CancerBaby’, blogging about her experience
with ovarian cancer, wrote: ‘The vernacular drones constantlyy. Rendered mute, you can
only listen to the din. It swirls around you, looping endlessly in patterns and figures you can’t
7 This ongoing research includes interviews with Canadian cancer ‘survivors’ on their experience of living
with and beyond cancer and the ways they relate to dominant biomedical and cultural discourses on
the disease. This research has not focused specifically on participants’ understandings of molecular
biomarkers, but it is a topic that has frequently come up in certain interviews, especially among prostate
and ovarian cancer survivors.
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quite recognize’ (quoted in Jain, 2007, p. 78). The diagnosed must work within this
paradigm to understand biomedical information, make medical decisions, manage medical
interactions and understand their illness experience (Sulik, 2009, p. 1072).
However, although biomarkers are generated in the context of complicated laboratory
tests, in some respects this numeric data seems easier to grasp than the other technoscientific
information patients are frequently presented with (X-rays, CT scans, biopsies and so on),
which must be interpreted by a specialist. One must learn how to read the blurred and
shadow-filled landscape of the X-ray – how to distinguish the topography of the body’s
organs from artefacts introduced during the process of image production. As Dumit (1999,
p. 177) observes, ‘X-rays reveal mysteries to experts who alone can explain their meaning’.
But despite our much-bemoaned innumeracy,8 most of us have general notions about
mathematics, tending to see high numbers relating to the body as more risky than low
numbers (Adelswa¨rd and Sachs, 1996, p. 1180). Thus, in a sea of floating signifiers,
biomarker numbers may provide a reassuringly concrete buoy for patients to cling to,
providing a sense of control and empowerment amidst the onslaught of information and
decision making that now characterises the ‘career’ of the cancer patient (c.f. Aronowitz,
2009).
This attachment to biomarker levels as a way of exerting some control over treatment is
evident in several published accounts of the experiences of cancer survivors. For example, an
ovarian cancer survivor in Howell et al’s (2003, p. 14) study noted:
When I started having the recurrence, I started to feel as though my oncologist wasn’t
listening. So, in the same way as that in the beginning, I was saying, you know, here are
these symptoms and something’s wrong. I felt like she [oncologist] was saying, ‘No, it’s
nothing’ or ‘It could be nothing.’ So again, I was not feeling that my sense of my own
body was being given the credence that it should be. So she would say things like,
‘Well, you know, we don’t want to give you chemotherapy. You wouldn’t want to have
chemotherapy if you don’t need it,’ kind of. So eventually, when my CA-125 went up
again, you know, in the fall of last year, . . . I started to ask about treatments.
(emphasis added)
The apparent objectivity of this numeric sign, with its comparatively unambiguous meaning,
provided a means of counteracting her oncologist’s dismissal of her subjective sense
of dis-ease. Thus, it was when her CA125 marker started to rise that she began to push for
treatment.
The semiotic power of biomarkers is also strongly evident in the case of ‘Patricia’,
a 51-year-old breast cancer survivor and former nurse Sulik (2009) interviewed as part of
her research into the creation of technoscientific illness identities. Patricia recounted
the following conversation with her oncologist regarding her concerns about metastases:
I said, ‘It [the cancer] could be widespread. We don’t knowy I haven’t had my bone
scan, so I haven’t had my tumor markers down [documented]’. He said, ‘You have far
8 See, for example, Paulos (1998). However, the extent of our innumeracy is debated, with some researchers
pointing to evidence of quite sophisticated mathematical calculations routinely made by ‘plain folks’
engaged in supermarket shopping (see Crump, 1990, p. 21).
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too much knowledge’. I said ‘But, I can’t not have the knowledge. You can’t suddenly
pretend you don’t know what you know’ (p. 1068).
To the obvious annoyance of her physician, Patricia was not prepared to brook his dismissal
of her concerns before documenting her tumour markers; these, rather than his professional
opinion, would determine what course of action was warranted.
The role of molecular biomarkers in empowering patients to challenge physician decision
making – especially in circumstances where physicians are seen to be overly passive or
nihilistic – is evident in the accounts of some cancer survivors in my ongoing research. For
example, ‘Jennifer’ was a 45-year-old Canadian ovarian cancer survivor treated 3 years
earlier with no signs of recurrence at the time of the interview. During the conversation, she
recounted how her oncologist had told her at her last visit, ‘well, just so you know, if it
comes back there’s nothing we can do’. She described her response to this off-hand comment
in the following way:
I was caught off guard with this comment because I said ‘Well, what do you mean?
Like, can’t we do the CA125 and that would tell me if – ?’ And she goes, ‘That’s – we
would only treat you if you’re symptomatic’. I said ‘well, if my [tumour marker] levels
are quite elevated and, like, there’s a laparoscopy, there’s all kinds of things’y.
Evident in these accounts is women’s awareness of the hierarchical relationship between
signs and symptoms (see Foucault, 1989). Each invokes the sovereignty of the sign over the
symptom to advocate a particular course of action. Thus, although the act of discerning the
signs of disease via a medical gaze was a way of ‘subtracting’ the individual from the picture
(Foucault, 1989, p. 15), the dual status of these molecular biomarkers as simultaneously
invisible but ‘transparent’ signs enables women to reassert individual claims. Notably,
instead of generating a sense of resignation or passivity in the face of biological destiny and
biomedical expertise, the forms of subjectification facilitated by molecular markers produce
in these women an active orientation to the future (c.f. Novas and Rose, 2000).
‘Duplicitous’9 Signs and the Backlash Against Molecularisation
The effects of molecular biomarkers on patients’ experiences of life with and beyond cancer
are clearly complex, leading in some instances to a new orientation to the body and to the
disease itself. However, although such markers have become a standard component of
disease surveillance for people diagnosed with a variety of cancers, questions about their
reliability remain in the field of biomedicine – and are the subject of ongoing debate. These
debates speak to the unevenness of processes of molecularisation – with moments of retreat
as well as embrace. As Hogarth et al (2012, p. 247) note, ‘the molecularisation of screening
may not be a zero-sum game in which new technologies eventually triumph over older ones’.
The recent CA125 controversy is a case in point. The findings of a large randomised
clinical trial (Rustin et al, 2009) have created intense debate about the role of CA125 in
monitoring ovarian cancer survivors. In this trial, those patients treated once they were
symptomatic, as opposed to when molecular signs of recurrence manifested (measured via
9 See Karam and Karlan (2010) for a discussion of the ‘duplicity’ of CA125 measurement.
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a doubling of serum marker levels), fared no worse – suggesting no survival advantage from
intensive CA125 surveillance. Particularly fascinating is the ways this debate about CA125
surveillance came to centre on the semiotic properties of the biomarker. For example,
a senior policy director of the Ovarian Cancer National Alliance (a US patient advocacy
organisation), speaking out in support of CA125 monitoring, stated: ‘It lets (people) know
what is going on in places (they) can’t see or feel in the body’, expressing her wariness at
relying solely on symptoms (Chitale, 2009, pp. 1234–1235). For this woman (echoing the
cancer survivors documented above), the ability of biomarker numbers to visualise the
invisible is intimately tied up with their value. However, for the director of a gynaecologic
oncology programme in Massachusetts, it is precisely this meaning that is the problem: ‘the
strong focus on CA125 levels may subtly lead doctors and patients to consider cancer
recurrence a numbers game, when it is far more complex’ (Chitale, 2009, p. 1234).
The overall consensus to emerge from these discussions appears to be that the technology
itself is beneficial when used judiciously – as a sign whose meaning must be evaluated
syntagmatically, in relation to a web of other signs and symptoms of disease recurrence. The
underlying ‘problem’, then, is perceived to be one of patient misunderstanding; patients, in
this framing, reify the numbers generated through biomarkers and are thereby guilty of
misplaced concreteness. Thus, there is intermittent talk in the literature of ‘CA125
preoccupation’ (Parker et al, 2006) and even ‘CA125 psychosis’10 (Guppy and Rustin, 2002,
p. 438; Palmer et al, 2006, p. 5) among patients. According to the director of the
Massachusetts gynaecologic oncology programme quoted above, ‘Some physicians will treat
(a patient) solely on an elevated CA125 with chemotherapy when patients are upset’
(Chitale, 2009, p. 1234, emphasis added). The underlying discourse here is of the emotional
and misinformed patient (and the complicit physician who panders to her whims)
inappropriately drawing on health care services – a focus that becomes explicit in the
emphasis on health care costs that has accompanied debates about these markers (see
Chitale, 2009, p. 1235).
The solution to this ‘problem’ of patient ‘misunderstanding’ of biomarkers? Patient
education: the now-universal response to any evidence of a disjuncture between patient and
physician perspectives on health, risk and illness (see Parker et al, 2006). Thus, the prevailing
view is that ovarian cancer survivors should be ‘informed about the usefulness and
drawbacks of CA125 measurements’ so they can make an ‘informed choice’ about being
monitored through the biomarker (Karam and Karlan, 2010; see also Fayed, 2009). This is,
of course, exactly the rhetoric that surrounds PSA screening – a test similarly marred by
controversy surrounding its utility in secondary cancer prevention.
However, a brief look at PSA screening demonstrates the limitations of the patient
education model. Despite the controversy surrounding PSA screening, it is an extremely
common test; for example, although it is not recommended in the Canadian guidelines,
almost 50 per cent of Canadian men over 50 report being screened at some point (Beaulac
et al, 2006). Indeed, studies have found that men still view the PSA test positively once they
have been ‘informed’ of its limitations (Hewitson and Austoker, 2005; Watson et al, 2006).
10 In the light of the fact that similar issues plague PSA monitoring, one cannot help but wonder whether this
pathologisation of patients deemed to become overly ‘preoccupied’ with their biomarker levels is implicitly
gendered.
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It therefore seems reasonable to surmise that if the opportunity for CA125 monitoring exists
most ovarian cancer survivors would choose to avail themselves of it, regardless of any
stated limitations. Indeed, patients priorly monitored through CA125 are often quite
distressed when their access to the test disappears, as has happened in some clinical settings
in the United Kingdom since the debates about CA125 monitoring first occurred (Amy Ford,
personal communication).
This attempt to limit the semiotic meanings of biomarkers via patient education (a version
of the ‘sometimes a cigar is just a cigar’11 lecture, one presumes) fundamentally misunders-
tands the nature of signs. Physicians’ underlying assumption appears to be that new
technologies can be introduced without implications for patient experiences of disease – that
signs can be reduced to their ‘objective’ biomedical meanings. Beyond the impossibility of
limiting semiosis in this way, it speaks to the ongoing inability of biomedicine to deal with
meaning; that is, its continual turn away from illness in favour of disease (Kleinman, 1988).
To quote Kleinman (1988, p. 30), ‘questions of the cultural significance of risk as bafflement
come to the fore in spite of professional (and societal) attempts to expunge meaning and
value from the equation of care’.
It also elides the ways in which patients have been transformed into ‘medical consumers’,
expected to take charge of their health through proactive and prevention-conscious
behaviour, rationality and choice (Sulik and Eich-Krohm, 2008). In this framework,
screening becomes tied up with the responsibilities of the ‘good’ neoliberal consumer/citizen
(Rose, 1993, 1999; Clarke et al, 2003, 2010). Molecular technologies thus operate in
a political and ethical field in which individuals are obliged to formulate life strategies,
maximise their life chances, take actions (or refrain from them) in order to increase their
quality of life and to act prudently in relation to themselves and others (Novas and Rose,
2000, p. 487). The pursuit of health is both a civic and individual duty. Thus, ideal ‘healthy’
citizens take in screening procedures such as cervical pap smears and blood cholesterol
tests – but only, of course, as appropriate (Petersen and Lupton, 1997). Pathological risk
management among the ‘worried well’ is to be discouraged (Wagner and Curran, 1984), the
ideal citizen being one who manages risk in a cost-effective way. ‘Good’ patients are required
to act in a similar fashion – to recognise their vulnerability and take steps to manage their
risks of disease recurrence via regular monitoring and surveillance, but not to use these
technologies ‘inappropriately’, in a cost-inflationary fashion.
Conclusions
If processes of molecularisation have transformed the face of primary and secondary cancer
prevention, engendering new forms of somatic individuality in asymptomatic populations,
their impact in the realm of tertiary prevention is no less fundamental (albeit far more
overlooked). Examined from a semiotic perspective, there are important differences between
these molecular technologies and the array of imaging technologies they now supplement.
Thoroughly indexical, these technologies serve to quantify disease along a continuum,
11 This statement is often attributed to Sigmund Freud, although evidence suggests that he probably did not
make it (see Quote Investigator, 2011). Indeed, it seems quite out of character for someone so centrally
attuned to symbolism.
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potentially producing an orientation to the self that is as much mathematical (or numeric) as
molecular. Numbers, with their apparent transparency and neutrality, become a powerful
lens through which experience is filtered. This is particularly true of the biomarkers used in
tertiary prevention, which some cancer survivors perceive as a material index of cancer’s
presence in the body.
While this numeric gaze seems to develop on both sides of the risk divide, with those ‘at risk’
of cancer and those ‘at risk’ of cancer recurrence or progression each developing a sense of
measured vulnerability, I have suggested that there are some potentially important differences
in the meaning of these technologies for those living with realised risk. Although molecular
biomarkers may create a sense of measured vulnerability in cancer patients, by making the
invisible visible they are simultaneously a reassuring sign – potentially more reassuring than
absence itself, given its semiotic potency. Moreover, their apparent simplicity and transparency
may also serve to provide a sense of control and empowerment, enabling cancer survivors to
challenge medical decision making and generating an active orientation to the future.
That said, I do not intend to suggest that the effects of these technologies are universal or
uniform. Certainly, some cancer survivors I have interviewed refer in vague terms to
‘markers’ and ‘blood tests’, placing no particular significance on numeric scores. Sulik
(2009) is careful to point out that patients who go on to develop technoscientific illness
identities may incorporate them in a partial rather than complete way. According to Clarke
et al (2010, p. 82), these identities may also be invoked strategically, seemingly accepted to
achieve particular goals (for example, advocating for a particular course of action), but in
other situations also refused. There is potentially also a strong class dimension to the ways
these technologies are taken up (or not) among cancer patients; as Crawford (1980) noted in
his original formulation of ‘healthism’, the middle class are more likely to subscribe to the
notion that health and disease are situated at the level of the individual, and to embrace the
norms of enterprising and responsible personhood that it assumes.
However, there is danger in ignoring the semiotic dimensions of these technologies – or,
worse still, assuming that they can be reduced to their biomedical meaning and
pathologising those for whom a number becomes more than just a number. For a cancer
survivor, is a cigar ever just a cigar? (Or a headache ever just a headache, or a sore joint ever
just a sore joint?) As Staiano-Ross (2007, p. 37) observes:
[T]he body that produces signs or from which signs are produced is a ‘knowing’ body,
one which can never be separated entirely from the social and political milieu within
which it existsy I cannot extract my body from thisy I visualize my body in ways
that are determined not by my having actually seen inside my body, but in ways I am
shown that the body must be. These are fully embodied attitudes and perceptions. The
signs of illness are not simply indices that point to an object within the body, but
symbolic ‘outputs’ of complex processes.
For these reasons, semiotically informed approaches have the potential to provide new
insights into patients’ understandings and experiences of molecular screening technologies
and to redress the limited analytic scope of much current research into the sociology of
screening (see Armstrong and Eborall, 2012). While it is widely accepted that the ‘molecular
gaze’ has transformed and reconfigured understandings of the body, semiotics helps us to
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explicate the nature of the differences between molecular screening technologies and older
methods of visualising the internal body. If, as I have speculated in this article, the molecular
gaze translates into a numeric gaze, we must more clearly grapple with the meaning of
biomarker numbers for patients. As I have tried to show, semiotically speaking, these numbers
differ in fundamental ways from the statistics and probabilities that precede and accompany
them. Instead, they purport to speak a more direct and personal truth: one taken directly from
the patient’s own blood. Although the implications of this shift require further study in the
realm of cancer, they also require consideration and analysis in the context of the growing
array of chronic conditions where molecular technologies are being developed to monitor
disease status, from HIV/AIDS (Price et al, 2007) and diabetes (Rossing et al, 2008), through
to neurological disorders (Mayeux, 2004) and cardiovascular diseases (Vasan, 2006).
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